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The Ironic State of Religious
Liberty in America
Frederick Mark Gedicks"
The constitutionality of organized graduation or classroom prayer in
public schools is an issue of continuing controversy in the United States.
There are, of course, numerous policy arguments for and against
allowing prayer in public schools, but I will be focusing on the constitu-
tional issues and consequently will have rather less to say about policy.
(I will disclose, however, that as a matter of policy, I think there are
problems with public schools' organizing and sponsoring group prayer as
part of graduation ceremonies or classroom activities; it would seem that
Mr. Peck, Mr. Sekulow, and I all agree on that, if nothing else.) What
perplexes me about this issue is why it continues to be an issue at all.
When I think about prayer in public schools, I have a difficult time
escaping the conclusion that there is really not very much at stake in
the constitutional controversy over this practice. There are no constitu-
tional obstacles to individual prayer in public schools,' and the effect of
the Equal Access Act is to allow student-initiated group prayer on most
public school campuses. In addition, it is rare that prayers given in the
classroom or other official public school contexts have significant
theological content. Consider, for example, one of the graduation prayers
at issue in Lee v. Weisman,2 the Supreme Court's latest decision in this
area:
God of the free, hope of the Brave: For the legacy of America where
diversity is celebrated and the rights of minorities are protected, we
* Professor of Law, Brigham Young University. University of Southern California
(J.D., 1980). Certain themes of this comment are drawn from my forthcoming book, The
Rhetoric of Church and State, to be published by Duke University Press in September
1995.
1. See Frederick Mark Gedicks, Motivation, Rationality, and Secular Purpose in
Establishment Clause Review, 1985 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 677, 720-22.
2. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
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thank you. May these young men and women grow up to enrich it.
For liberty of American, we thank you. For the liberty of America, we
thank you. May these new graduates grow up to guard it.. For the
political process of America in which all its citizens may participate, for
its court system where all may seek justice we thank you. May those
we honor this morning always turn to it in trust. For the destiny of
America we thank you. May the graduates of Nathan Bishop Middle
School so live that they might help to share it. May our aspirations for
our country and for these young people, who are our hope for the
future, be richly fulfilled. Amen.'
It's hard to find anything to disagree with in this prayer. Although the
words are undeniably eloquent, the sentiments expressed are nonethe-
less so innocuous, and are phrased so generally, that the prayer is
virtually without content. As such, it is a perfect example of the
American civil religion--"faintly Protestant platitudes which reaffirm...
the religious base of American culture despite being largely void of
theological significance."'
On the one hand, given the theologically vacuous nature of most
organized public school prayers, it ought not to be that large of an
imposition to ask that nonbelievers sit quietly through thirty or forty
seconds of vaguely religious platitudes. In fact, when compared to the
free exercise cases in which the Supreme Court has found that constitu-
tionally significant coercion of religious belief does not exist, the
argument that such coercion exists in graduation or classroom prayer
situations like Weisman is ludicrous. In Iyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Ass'n,' for example, the Supreme Court found that government
action which threatened outright destruction of native American religion
did not trigger the protections of the Free Exercise Clause."
Compared to the coercion suffered by native American believers in
Lyng, the offense experienced by nonbelievers who heard the Weisman
prayer is pretty small constitutional potatoes. But this would seem to
cut against public school prayer as much as it does in favor of it. Given
that individual and student-led prayer is already permitted in public
schools, and that graduation and classroom prayers are usually
theologically inconsequential in the way I have described, very little is
3. Id. at 2652-53.
4. Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Religious, the Secular, and the Antithetical, 20 CAP. U.
L. REv. 113, 122 (1991). See also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 422 (1962) (reviewing
constitutionality of recitation of the following prayer in state public schools: "Almighty God,
we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our
parents, our teachers, and our Country"). Id.
5. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
6. Id. at 451-52.
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lost when such prayers are constitutionally prohibited or otherwise
eliminated from public education. Even for those (like me) who believe
that religion has been wrongfully excluded from American public life,
and religious people unfairly treated by secular public institutions,
public school prayer seems an issue that should not stir up passion
against these wrongs.
But make no mistake, passions continue to be aroused by the
constitutional prohibition of graduation and classroom prayer. Why do
so many people seem to care whether public schools may sponsor or
otherwise encourage prayer? While nothing very important seems to be
at stake in an examination of the merits of public school prayer by itself,
whether or not prayer is allowed in public schools has become a symbol
of what has become known as the "culture war."7 For religious
conservatives, the Supreme Court's prohibition of organized prayer in
public schools encapsulates the moral decline of the last several decades.
For civil libertarians, the return of organized prayer to public schools is
reason to man the ramparts and drive the religious barbarians back
from the gates that protect the rational peace created by post-Enlighten-
ment liberalism. It remains important to discuss classroom prayer
because the fault lines dividing opponents in this particular conflict are
mirrored in many other conflicts about church and state, conflicts in
which more significant religious liberty issues are at stake.'
Although I believe classroom prayer to be ill-advised, I do not believe
that it is unconstitutional for any of the reasons advanced by Mr. Peck.9
At the same time, I believe that the strategy of using existing free
speech doctrine to argue for individual and voluntary group prayer,
exemplified by Mr. Sekulow, does not succeed in constitutional terms,
and threatens authentic religious faith and worship as well." I will
conclude by noting a political aspect to this controversy that I find
troubling: Given that so little ought to be at stake in the controversy
over public school prayer, the continued pursuit of satisfaction on this
issue by some religious conservatives suggests the troubling possibility
that they are seeking less to restore free exercise denied than to signal
who is in charge of American politics and culture.
7. See JAMES DAvISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA(1991). 1
8. Cf James R. Stoner, Jr., Amending the School Prayer Amendment, FIRST THINGS,
May 1995, at 16 (arguing that the reintroduction of classroom prayer would symbolize
society's opposition to the modem trend of secularization in public life).
9. See infra Part I.
10. See infra Part 11.
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I.
Mr. Peck argues that the effort to pass a school prayer amendment
rejects the American idea of religious liberty that confines government
to public life and religion to private life.1 He further contends that the
effort to frame school prayer as primarily a matter of individual
expression, as Mr. Sekulow does, ignores that the Establishment Clause
imposes limitations on religious speech in public schools that do not
restrict other kinds of expression. There are problems with both
arguments.
With respect to the first argument, I am skeptical that there is
anything like "the American idea of religious liberty"; if there is such an
animal, my reading of American history suggests that until recently, it
looked a lot more like Mr. Sekulow's idea than Mr. Peck's. Jefferson and
Madison may well support Mr. Peck's reading of the American tradition
of church-state relations, but it is far from clear that their views on the
proper relationship of church and state coincided with the majority
sentiment in the early American states. For example, the Virginia bill
providing for tax assessment for the support of ministers and churches,
so vigorously opposed by Jefferson and Madison, was supported by
George Washington and Patrick Henry. 2 Similarly, John Adams was
a proponent of the tax-supported Congregationalist establishment in
Massachusetts."s
If we move forward into American history from the founding period of
the late eighteenth century, things get worse for Mr. Peck's argument.
From the early nineteenth century until well into the twentieth century,
the United States was governed by what Mark De Wolfe Howe called the
"de facto Protestant establishment" under which Protestant Christianity
was a major, uncontroversial, and coercive participant in American
public life.14 Although state-supported religious establishments had
disappeared by the 1830s, Protestants remained in control of virtually
all of the major organizations and institutions in American public life,
11. Robert S. Peck, The Threat to the American Idea of Religious Liberty, 46 MERCER
L. REV. 1023 (1995).
12. Douglas Laycock, Nonpreferential'Aid to Religion: A False Claim about Original
Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 875, 896 & n.101. Laycock notes that Washington later
withdrew his support because the issue had become too divisive. Id.
13. ARLIN M. ADAMS & CHARLES J. EMMERICH, A NATION DEDICATED TO RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL HERITAGE OF THE RELIGION CLAuSES 27 (1990).
14. MARK DE WOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 11-15, 31, 98 (1965).
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including public education.15 Non-Protestants were tolerated in the
classic sense. That is, they were allowed to believe and to act in their
non-Protestant ways as long as they knew their place and kept to it.
However, when non-Protestant religion challenged fundamental
Protestant values which were thought to lie at the foundation of civilized
society in the United States, as Mormon polygamy did in the late
nineteenth century, classic toleration turned quickly into classic
persecution."
The "tradition" of prohibiting government encouragement of religious
belief and practice that Mr. Peck attributes to the United States did not
appear in Supreme Court opinions until the 1940s,' 7 did not become the
doctrine of the Court until the 1960s,"8 and has never commanded the
support of more than a small minority of Americans.' 9 In sum, there
simply isn't much history in support of the position that the American
tradition of church and state precludes graduation or classroom prayer;
to the contrary, there's quite a bit of history in favor of such prayer.
Mr. Peck's second point is a variation of the separationist argument
that generally confines religion to private life and imposes unique
disabilities on religious speech in public life. Separationism purports to
achieve government neutrality between religion and nonreligion by
having government withdraw from religious matters, and by keeping
religion out of public life, effectively confining it to private life. But if
religion is private, and thus out of place in public life, then religious
organizations and individuals are penalized whenever they enter public
life, because their most authentic motivations for political action are
immediately ruled procedurally out of order. This is a rather odd notion
of "neutrality." One could argue that the result is neutral because it
15. For summaries of the mutual reinforcement and extensive interactions of
government authority and Protestant religion during this period, see HAROLD S. BERMAN,
FAITH AND ORDER: THE RECONCILIATION OF LAW AND RELIGION 211-14, 225-30 (1993);
Laycock, supra note 12, at 914-18; David M. Smolin, The Judeo-Christian Tradition and
Self-Censorship in Legal Discourse, 13 U. DAYTON L. REV. 345, 380-85 (1988); John Witte,
Jr., The Theology and Politics of the First Amendment Religion Clauses: A Bicentennial
Essay, 40 EMORY L.J. 489, 497-99 (1991).
16. See, e.g., Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United
States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Murphy v. Ramsey, 114
U.S. 15 (1885); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
17. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
18. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
19. See, e.g., HERBERT MCCLOSKEY & AIDA BRILL, DIMENSIONS OF TOLERANCE: WHAT
AMERICANS THINK ABOUT CIVIL LIBERTIES 133-35 (1983); Ronald Brownstein, Dissatisfied
Americans May Spell Democrat Losses, L.A. TIMES, July 28, 1994, at Al & A19 (Orange
County ed.).
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treats religion the same as all activities that should be confined to
private life, penalizing them all when they enter public life.' Regard-
less of whether this argument might succeed academically, it is clearly
insufficient to persuade most believers that they are being treated fairly.
This suggests an important, practical point (law professors occasional-
ly think of them). Not to put too fine a point on the situation, separa-
tionism has been a decisive failure as a foundation for religion clause
doctrine. The doctrine is both incoherent and without significant public
support. That is, the doctrine cannot give a rational account of Supreme
Court decisions under either religion clause, and it is highly unpopular.
There cannot be two worse conditions for a doctrine to overcome.
Constitutional doctrine can succeed-that is, it can endure and have
significant effect in American life-if it has either coherence or popular
support. Ideally a doctrine should have both, but one or the other will
do.
For example, the pre-Roe privacy cases, Griswold v. Connecticut21 and
Eisenstadt v. Baird,22 lack a persuasive and coherent legal rationale.
But neither decision ran significantly against popular morality; there
wasn't ever much popular sentiment in favor of restricting married adult
access to condoms, and even at the time Eisenstadt was decided in the
early 1970s, most Americans were simply not outraged at a constitution-
al result that guaranteed such access even to unmarried adults. As a
result, the incoherence of the cases didn't (and still doesn't) matter all
that much.
On the other hand, consider the Flagburning Cases." These are
extremely unpopular. (In fact, the number of people in favor of
punishing people who desecrate the flag may be as great as those who
are in favor of organized public school prayer.) But the Flagburning
Cases have a coherent, rational justification: Burning the American flag
communicates dramatic criticism of the United States and its govern-
ment. As such, it is political speech, the protection of which goes to the
very heart of the First Amendment.' The Supreme Court has been
rather consistent in holding government to a generally high level of
justification when it tries to punish critical political speech with
20. I critized this argument in Frederick Mark Gedicks, Public Life and Hostility to
Religion, 78 VA. L. REV. 671 (1992).
21. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
22. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
23. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1989).
24. See, e.g., ALmANDER MEIKJOHN, POLICAL FREEDOM (1960); Vincent Blasi, The
Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 521.
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punishment, because punishment in these circumstances looks suspi-
ciously like an effort to silence the critics.2" The existence of an
explainable rationale for the decisions makes the lack of popular support
for their result relatively unimportant.
Unfortunately, current religion clause doctrine is neither coherent nor
popular. The Court's decisions in this area have been variously
described as "ad hoc,"' "eccentric,"27 "misleading and distorting,"s
"historically unjustified and textually incoherent," and "riven by
contradiction.80 Steven Smith has observed that "people who disagree
about nearly everything else in the law agree that establishment clause
doctrine is seriously, perhaps distinctively, defective."1Moreover, changes that would make the doctrine cohere with the
separationist ideology that underlies it-for example, abandonment of
the ideal of neutrality in favor of outright preference of secularism and
discouragement of religion-would be uniquely unpopular. One would
hope that installation of a sort of nineteenth century Christian
majoritarianism is equally unthinkable. Certainly both options would
threaten religious liberty. Lacking popular support, and unable to give
any coherent account of itself, religion clause doctrine has become like
economic due process in the 1930s-a failed doctrine ripe for disman-
tling.
25. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (statutory limitations on political
contributions and expenditures subject to close scrutiny by a reviewing court); United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (government action that burdens communicative
conduct may be upheld if it is within the government's power and furthers an important
government interest unrelated to suppression of free expression in the least restrictive
manner). See also Spencev. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (affixing peace symbol to flag
in protest of then-current foreign and domestice policies of United States held protected
expression under the First Amendment); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969) (state
statute permitting punishment for speaking contemptuous words about the flag held
unconstitutional).
26. Jesse Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the
Conflict, 41 U. PITr. L. REv. 673, 680 (1980).
27. Phillip E. Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in First Amendment Religious
Doctrine, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 817, 817 (1984).
28. HOWE, supra note 14, at 156.
29. Michael A. Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection
Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311,317 (1986).
30. Michael W. McConnell & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of
Religious Freedom, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 1 (1989).
31. Steven D. Smith, Separation and the 'Secular': Reconstructing the Disestablishment
Decision, 67 TEx. L. REV. 955, 956 (1989).
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II.
Mr. Sekulow and his associates argue that Supreme Court decisions
under the Speech Clause-not the Free Exercise or Establishment
Clauses--require that public, ceremonial prayer be permitted in public
schools as private individual expression. 82 This argument is incorrect.
Perhaps more important, defending religious worship with this kind of
argument, even assuming it were legally supportable, is ill-advised for
people who care about authentic expressions of religious faith.
First, this argument fails on its own terms-it supports the conclusion
that individual prayer is constitutionally protected, but not the
conclusion that prayer that is institutionally organized or encouraged by
public school action is protected. As I indicated, there is currently no
impediment to individual student prayer-silent or spoken-and
voluntary student-initiated prayer on most public school campuses, so
Mr. Sekulow's argument that 27nker" ought to protect individual
expressions of religious faith like voluntary prayer is correct, but beside
the point. What is clearly prohibited by current constitutional law is
group prayer that is officially sanctioned and monitored by teachers or
other school officials as part of the normal school day or a graduation
ceremony.' Tinker has nothing to say about the constitutionality of
government sponsorship or endorsement of religious expression.
Mr. Sekulow's public forum analysis is unavailing. Current public
forum doctrine holds that if a forum is truly a public one, the govern-
ment may not use the content or viewpoint of a proposed speaker's
speech as a basis for determining whether the speaker may use the
forum.38 In other words, any person who can satisfy reasonable
eligibility criteria unrelated to content or viewpoint is entitled to use a
public forum for communicative purposes. While certain portions of a
public school, or even a public school day, may be considered public
forums (at least for certain limited purposes)," it is doubtful that either
classrooms or graduation ceremonies may be so construed. Indeed, one
would think that content and viewpoint based regulation of speech is
32. Jay Sekulow, James Henderson & John Tuskey, Proposed Guidelines for Student
Religious Speech and Observance in Public Schools, 46 MERCER L. REV. 1017 (1995).
33. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
34. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2469 (1992); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985);
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
35. E.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993); Widmar
v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
36. Cf Westside Comm. Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (finding high
school activity period is limited public forum for purposes of Equal Access Act).
1164 [Vol. 46
IRONIC STATE
precisely what one needs to plan and implement effective public school
curricula and activities.
If the Establishment Clause means anything, it ought to mean that
public schools cannot sponsor and incorporate a religious worship service
into the school day. If such sponsorship and incorporation is really the
aim of Mr. Sekulow's argument, then perhaps "barbarians-at-the-gates,
sky-is-falling" secular liberals, with whom I am not normally in
sympathy, have a point.
Attempting to protect religious worship and expression exclusively
through the Speech Clause also demonstrates the folly of fighting battles
on your opponent's field using his or her weapons. Current Establish-
ment Clause doctrine prohibits inclusion of religion in public life as
religion. Religion is only properly present in public life as a subgroup
of some secular category.
Three cases make this clear. In McGowan v. Maryland, the Supreme
Court held that Sunday closing laws did not violate the Establishment
Clause because secular rationales for the laws-encouraging family
togetherness through a uniform day of rest and recreation-had
displaced the laws' original religious purpose.37 In Lynch v. Donnel-
ly ' and County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 39 the Supreme Court upheld
local government displays of Christian and Jewish religious symbols, on
the ground that the secular context in which the symbols appeared
neutralized their religious content." In Lynch, for example, the
majority found it important that the display of the Christian nativity at
issue in that case was set up in close proximity to a display of Santa and
his reindeer.
41
Likewise in Allegheny, Justices Blackmun and O'Connor argued that
display of a menorah in proximity to a Christmas tree and a sign
"saluting liberty" obscured and overshadowed the religious significance
of the menorah, and merely suggested that Chanukah and Christmas
were different cultural manifestations of the same "winter holiday
season. 2 In each case, practices or symbols that aided or endorsed a
particular religious viewpoint were permitted because the Court
managed to convince itself-and perhaps nobody else-that the disputed
practices and symbols had no significant religious effect. It seems to me
37. 366 U.S. 420, 445, 449, 452 (1961).
38. 465 U.S. 665 (1984).
39. 492 U.S. 581 (1989).
40. 465 U.S. at 671; 492 U.S. at 613, 615-18.
41. 465 U.S. at 671.
42. 492 U.S. at 613, 615-18 (opinion of Blackmun, J.); id. at 633-35 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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a rather Pyrrhic victory to have repulsed a constitutional challenge to
government sponsored religious activity by successfully arguing that
Jesus Christ and Santa Clause, or Chanukah and Frosty the Snowman,
are conceptually indistinguishable.
The same danger exists in the argument that public school prayer is
constitutionally protected by general Speech Clause principles. In other
words, prayer is protected by the same rationale that extends constitu-
tional protection to non-obscene pornography, nude-dancing, protest
rallies, and political commercials. Yet prayer is a form of worship; if it
is expression at all, it is a unique kind of expression. Forcing prayer
into secular categories for the expedient of gaining entry to public
schools runs the risk that prayer will be stripped of its uniqueness in the
effort to make it look like secular communication protected by the
Speech Clause.
III.
Although students can pray in public schools at any time as
individuals, and although under the Equal Access Act most students
may engage in voluntary group prayers right before or right after school,
or during their free time during the school day, it seems that for many
religious conservatives this is not enough. As a member of the Mormon
church, a minority faith that is usually relegated by orthodox Protes-
tants to the periphery of the Christian tradition (if not beyond), this
makes me nervous. I wonder, "Why isn't it enough to be able to pray by
oneself, or to pray voluntarily with other like-minded students as an
extra-curricular activity? Why is it so important to make prayer an
official school-sponsored part of graduation ceremonies or classroom
activities?"
Perhaps the answer is that some religious conservatives believe that
orthodox Christianity should be the preferred religious faith in the
United States, with all others merely to be tolerated as minorities.
Mormons are particularly well situated to worry about this possibility
because their religion was nearly destroyed by a regime of Christian
tolerance in the late nineteenth century. The ideology of separatism and
the religion clause doctrine that is built upon this ideology would
presumably protect religious minorities like Mormons from this
possibility, but as I have indicated, separationism and its doctrine have
failed. That the doctrine that might protect religious minorities from
persecution is rationally bankrupt and widely rejected only suggests the
seriousness of the crisis that religious liberty now confronts in the
United States.
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